Introduction
The forces of globalisation and commodification, and the countervailing forces of deglobalisation (of capital) and decommodification (of basic needs), are together locked in combat in South Africa, in a manner as polarised as anywhere in the world. These circumstances allow us to pose three stark questions. First, what dynamics underlie the trends of international 'neoliberal' market expansion and socio-economic polarisation, and of resistance? Second, taking two periods Á/ the 1990s, and 2000 Á/2005 Á/ within South Africa's transition to democracy, can we compress the processes of urban policy-making and practical implementation, and identify a coherent trajectory associated with the rollout and roll-back of neoliberalism? Third, how do we interpret the sometimes explosive political mobilisations in South African cities since the early 1990s, and what might they imply in terms of future social development and public policy?
There are, too, increasingly universal urban processes associated with rampant market penetration, which in South Africa took the extreme form described by Harold Wolpe (1972) as 'articulations of modes of production', perhaps most apparent in the superexploitative migrant labour system. These have returned on a global scale, in the sphere of 'reproduction' of the broader social system, and have extremely biased gendered outcomes detrimental to women. Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill (2003, p. 36) have shown how, in rich and poor countries alike, Reprivatisation of social reproduction involves at least four shifts that relate to the household, the state and social institutions, and finally the basic mechanisms of livelihood, particularly in poorer countries: .
household and caring activities are increasingly provided through the market and are thus exposed to the movement of money; . societies seem to become redefined as collections of individuals (or at best collections of families), particularly when the state retreats from universal social protection;
. accumulation patterns premised on connected control over wider areas of social life and thus the provisions for social reproduction; . survival and livelihood. For example, a large proportion of the world's population has no effective health insurance or even basic care.
These processes have impinged upon cities for many years, orienting their managers and lead capitalists towards urban entrepreneurial competition. Since the 1986 launch of the World Bank's New Urban Management Program, a neoliberal global policy consensus solidified, leading a key official of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements to insist that the 1996 Habitat conference in Istanbul should be about 'creating a level playing field for competition among cities, particularly across national borders; on understanding how cities get ahead in this competition; on global capital transfers, the new economic order and the weakening of the nation-state. . . . The city is not a community, but a conglomerate of firms, institutions, organisations and individuals with contractual agreements among them' (Angel, 1995, p. 4) . The World Bank's 1991 policy paper on urban management and the UN's Development Program and Habitat housing division adopted similar strategies, alongside the US Agency for International Development, British Department for International Development, Canadian CIDA, the Japanese and other official donor agencies. The overall orientation was nearly identical to the austerity policies at the macro-economic scale, with US AID consultants from the Urban Institute (1990) spelling out to South African policy-makers in 1990 the important change in policy thinking in the developing world closely linked to the acceptance of market-oriented economies: the growing acceptance of rapid urbanisation. . . . An emphasis on national economic growth and export-led development will usually mean that new investment resources must be directed to already successful regions and cities. . . . Governments have considerable control over the entire cost structure of urban areas. Public policy should be directed to lowering these costs.
'Lowering these costs' Á/ especially by lowering the social wage (including subsidies for vital basic needs like water) Á/ has been crucial for the more direct insertion of competitive cities into the world economy. The focus here is not merely on limiting public financing of social services to those deemed to add value (though this is one of the more obvious effects of structural adjustment, and the catalyst for many an IMF Riot). Just as importantly, the New Urban Management Program also highlights the productivity of urban capital as it flows through urban land markets (now enhanced by titles and registration), through housing finance systems (featuring solely private sector delivery and an end to state subsidies), through the much-celebrated (but extremely exploitative) informal economy, and through (often newly-privatised) urban services such as transport, sewage, water, electricity, schooling and even primary health care services (via intensified cost-recovery).
Neoliberal Roots of South African Urban Policy
South Africa is illustrative of neoliberal urban policy drift beginning in the early 1980s (see details in Bond, 2000 Bond, , 2002 Bond, , 2004a Bond, ,b, 2005a . At that stage, influential actors with strong connections to the late-apartheid government Á/ the Urban Foundation, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the SA Housing Trust and commercial banks Á/ embarked upon surprisingly effective advocacy and implementation strategies, on behalf of deracialised and liberalised cities. Pass Laws restricting black South Africans' inmigration were dropped; permanent township housing tenure was formalised; housing credit began to flow (ultimately providing 200,000 township bonds during the late 1980s); and the privatisation of the housing stock (the 'Great Sale') began. At that stage, the World Bank's neoliberal policy argumentation fed directly into the Urban Foundation's influential 'Urban Futures' reports series, and then into the F.W. DeKlerk regime's relaxation of racial controls over urban form, including the erosion of economic decentralisation subsidies associated with two dozen smaller cities near Bantustan borders.
The basic problem for the South African capitalists who funded the Urban Foundation was an over-accumulation crisis and stagnation borne of constipated internal markets (Bond, 2005a, Chapter 1) . This meant combining the drive to globalise production with the opening of new accumulation possibilities Á/ such as private-sector township housing construction Á/ for both economic and political reasons. As liberal-capitalist political strategist Zach de Beer (1988) put it, 'When people are housed Á/ more especially when they are home-owners Á/ they are not only less likely to be troublesome. They are also likely to feel they have a stake in the society and an interest in its stability'.
Hence the 'elite transition' married a highly-circumscribed political democratisation to commercial deregulation, to trade and financial liberalisation, and to the demobilisation of mass democratic movements. The African National Congress (ANC) government of Nelson Mandela (1994 Á/1999) articulated the combined sensibility of globalisation and commodification in the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development's (1995) Urban Development Strategy : 'Seen through the prism of the global economy, our urban areas are single economic units that either rise, or stagnate and fall together. . . . South Africa's cities are more than ever strategic sites in a transnationalised production system'. Even in a relatively wealthy country with enormous state capacity, the shift in priorities towards global competitiveness justified a diminished commitment to meeting basic needs. There soon resulted dramatic national-local operating budget cutbacks (85 per cent in real terms during the early 1990s) and intense interurban entrepreneurial competition; i.e., a 'race to the bottom' mentality aimed at attracting investment at all costs, including at the expense of service delivery to low-income residents.
Discussing why cross-subsidisation of electricity prices to benefit the poor was not being seriously considered during the mid-1990s, for example, the government's leading infrastructure official, Chippy Olver, confessed, 'If we increase the price of electricity to users like Alusaf [a major aluminium exporter], their products will become uncompetitive and that will affect our balance of payments ' (Mail and Guardian , 22 November 1996) . Alusaf pays approximately one-tenth the price that retail consumers do. Moreover, the ecological price of cheap power Á/ both at the site of production and in the coal-gathering and burning process Á/ is not factored in, which in turn contributes to South Africa's extreme culpability for global-warming and for local pollution damage to the citizenry and economy.
Hence the overall thrust of both late-apartheid and post-apartheid urban development policies and programmes Á/ in fields such as governance, housing, infrastructure, local economic development, planning and public works Á/ was to accept and mediate the underlying dynamics of market systems in land, housing, commerce and production. As a result, 'class apartheid' may be the best single phrase to explain the nature of the emerging urban experience. This is true not just in South Africa. Negative characteristics of urban development driven by globalisation and commodification pressures are becoming universal across the Third World. In his speech to the Johannesburg Urban Futures Conference in July 2000 , Manuel Castells (2000 , evoked the dilemmas of apartheid-like geographical forms: 'The segregated city is different than the segmented city. When the elites quit the city, the pattern of communication breaks down. It leads to ecological devastation such as deterioration of agricultural land and increases in epidemics. The problem is not overpopulation but intense concentration of poor people in megacities'. Castells warned of a new 'concentration of the urban but without mechanisms of social integration' which in turn means that municipal officials 'adapt to global forces by playing a game of competitiveness rather than heeding concerns of citizens'.
Dating to their nineteenth century origins, South African cities reflected apartheidcapitalist residential, commercial, industrial, and environmental processes based not only upon racial prejudice but also upon labour-reproduction, capital-accumulation and socialcontrol motives (Hendler, 1987; Lupton, 1992; McCarthy, 1987; McCarthy & Smit, 1987; Robinson, 1996) . Women were especially victimized, because urban capitalist managers designed a subsidy from the rural areas so as to lower the cost of workers in the mines and factories. Economic development was, according to the Chamber of Mines, dependent upon this system. As a leading mine official testified to a government commission in 1944, 'The ability of the mines to maintain their native labour force by means of tribal natives from the reserves at rates of pay which are adequate for this migratory class of native, but inadequate in practice for the detribalised urban native, is a fundamental factor of the economy of the gold mining industry'. The migrant 'tribal natives' did not, when they were young, require companies to pay their parents enough to cover school fees, or pay taxes for government schools to teach workers' children. When sick or disabled, those workers were often shipped back to their rural homes until ready to work again. When the worker was ready to retire, the employer typically left him a pittance, such as a cheap watch, not a pension that allowed the elderly to survive in dignity. From youth through to illness to old age, capitalists were let off the hook. The subsidy covering child-rearing, recuperation and old age was provided by rural African women. The central lesson from this crucial aspect of apartheid was that capitalism systematically looted the Bantustans, and especially their women, in the supply of such a large proportion of cheap labour power (Legassick, 1974; O'Meara, 1996; Wolpe, 1972) .
Given that these motives continue, today, practically unchanged (notwithstanding formal legal deracialisation) and that the migrant labour system still thrives in South Africa, it is no surprise that class, gender and generational biases have persisted since 1994, and that racial discrimination also continues in various forms. What has become additionally worrisome is that while residential desegregation of middle and upper-class neighbourhoods has occurred relatively smoothly, most other features of urban life today embody even more severe inequality and uneven development than occurred under apartheid. Evidence is provided below, but first it is worth considering why this outcome was not an accident, but a logical result of 1990s neoliberal urban policy, especially the 1994 Housing White Paper and the 1998 Local Government White Paper (space constraints prevent further elaboration of similar policy documents, including the 1995 Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework and the 1995 Urban Development Strategy , or a variety of other sectoral policies of relevance to the urban experience) (Bond, 2000 (Bond, , 2002 (Bond, , 2005a . It is also worth noting the extreme contrasts between these policies and the ANC's 1994 campaign platform, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) , which was generated largely by civil society activists allied to the ANC. Inbetween, the new government came under intense pressure from local and global neoliberal forces, including persistent 'reconnaissance missions' and advisory teams from the World Bank (Bond, 2003 (Bond, , 2004a (Bond, , 2005a .
As a result, the Housing White Paper (HWP) was grounded upon 'the fundamental pre-condition for attracting [private] investment, which is that housing must be provided within a normalised market' (Ministry of Housing, 1994) . The document was approved by Cabinet in December 1994 at the behest of the minister, Joe Slovo, also chair of the SA Communist Party, who died of cancer in January 1995. An anticipated kickstart in housing bond financing as a result of Slovo's October 1994 'Record of Understanding' with the commercial banks never materialised, but many of the core problems of housing in the post-apartheid era were rooted in the housing policymakers' faith in credit. Indeed, the market-centred approach to low-income housing delivery had several unfortunate consequences, including:
.
an inequitable allocation of funding between different low-income groups (favouring those with higher incomes because they have the capacity to gain access to credit and hence are the target of private sector developers' projects); . a low rate of delivery, witnessed by the growth in the housing backlog (in part because of an estimated million subsidies granted between 1994 and 1999, only 60 per cent had actually been taken up, and of these only 16 per cent had received credit due to bank reticence to lend); . the destruction of existing housing construction capacity due to the failure to recognise contradictions within the market and provide a state-driven counter-cyclical construction boost; . communities being disempowered in project planning as well as in their more general needs for capacity (given that many local leaders moved into government), which led to unwanted products as well as an increasing gap between developers' promises and community expectations, often resulting in intense conflict; . a reluctance on the part of the private sector developers to be involved in conflict-ridden areas where the need for housing was often the greatest; . abuse of the scheme by local authorities and developers, leading to a reduction in value of the subsidy by 50 per cent in some cases; . the failure of the two main credit lubrication strategies, the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme (which indirectly acted as a red-lining instrument) and Servcon (as there were very few available low-cost properties for households to 'rightsize' to after defaulting on bonds);
. a lack of success by the National Housing Finance Corporation in reducing interest rates or increasing access to credit for low-income households (and indeed in keeping afloat targeted intermediary lenders, such as the defunct Community Bank); and, .
the inevitability of reproducing apartheid-style ghettoes, although these were not segregated along racial lines but in class terms, specifically whether the new slum settlements included Á/ as a matter of public policy Á/ sewage systems, electricity lines, stormwater drains, and tarred roads.
Just as importantly, the implications of a market-centred approach to housing entailed the withering of state capacity in fields as diverse as construction, building materials management, public works delivery, retail financing, and management. The ability of provincial and local governments to take up the additional responsibilities they were subsequently given by the 1996 Ministerial Task Team on Short-term Delivery appears severely limited. Similarly, the HWP insistence upon cost-recovery on tariffs for basic services (water, electricity, rubbish removal, etc.) ignored the huge subsidy that black township dwellers historically provided to white municipalities (by virtue of having no township tax base), as well as the failure to bill residents at local level and many other manifestations of systemic break-down. In contrast, the RDP recognised such problems and hence advocated redistributive ('lifeline') tariffs established at national-level for services such as water and electricity. The HWP implicitly rejected the RDP 's commitment to more equitable, efficient national tariff structures based on cross-subsidisation.
Many other deviations from the RDP mandate could be recorded. The RDP demanded progressive policy provisions in relation to savings, bond guarantees, construction regulation, building materials prices, emerging builders, tenure bias, legislation protecting tenants' rights, squatters' rights, and the rights of people living in informal settlements, none of which were considered, much less endorsed, in the HWP . The RDP also suggested the need for further legislation regarding evictions, exploitation in rentals, and many other housing-related problems, as well as interventions in the land market. The RDP noted that 'All legislative obstacles and constraints to housing and credit for women must be removed'. Elsewhere in the RDP , the rights and needs of disabled people were also cited. All of these were profoundly distorted or missing from the HWP .
In March 1998, the Local Government White Paper (LGWP) was sent by the Ministry of Constitutional Development (1998) To address these problems, redistribution should have been a central strategy. The LGWP offered three specific (if relatively minor and localised) techniques: 'service subsidies . . . support to community organisations in the form of finances, technical skills or training . . . linkage policies to directly link profitable growth or investment with redistribution and community development'. Yet there was no recognition that under an export-oriented logic of orthodox municipal economic development, competition between cities for new investors would trump redistribution, particularly the widespread cross-subsidies required to finance township services.
With geographical class segregation intensifying since 1994 due to the distant location of new settlements on inexpensive (if dysfunctional) land, the LGWP acknowledged that income differences threatened to generate a neo-apartheid urban form, for 'inadequate service levels may perpetuate stark spatial divisions between low, middle or high income users (particularly in urban areas) and jeopardise the socio-economic objectives of the Council'. Yet there was no official recognition that the low levels of service delivery associated with the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework Á/ especially pit latrines which cannot be incrementally upgraded to water-borne sanitation Á/ for low-income people would permanently relegate the poor to far-away ghettoes. Upwardly mobile residents desiring higher infrastructure levels would have to emigrate from these ghettoes instead of investing in their residences, because it is impossible to incrementally install the connector piping for sewerage to individual households.
Additionally, the various options for 'approaches to service delivery' were highly biased in favour of privatisation. None of the arguments for municipal transformation offered by the SA Municipal Workers Union, for example, were considered, nor were more visionary community trusts advocated by civic associations (Mayekiso, 1996) . The LGWP at least acknowledged that privatisation carried risks of 'cherry-picking' (refusal to provide services to low-income areas), poor quality services, and unfair labour practices. Notably, though, no warnings were made about excessive levels of profit, such as the 30'/ per cent in US$ terms demanded by most foreign investors in municipal infrastructure, including the World Bank's International Finance Corporation.
The LGWP chapter on Municipal Finance failed to divulge the conditions under which roughly half of all municipalities were found to be financially insolvent. After failing to mention, much less resolve, these obvious problems, the chapter proceeded to take the most extreme, conservative interpretation of tariffs (price) policy for water, electricity, and other municipal services. The LGWP provisions that (a) there must be 'payment in proportion to the amount consumed', (b) there must be 'full payment of service costs', and (c) tariffs must 'ensure local economies are competitive' by insulating businesses from cross-subsidies, together had the effect of preventing municipalities from adopting (a) progressive block tariffs, (b) a universal lifeline service to all consumers, and (c) local level redistribution from often wasteful business users to low-income consumers. All these provisions directly violated the mandate given in the RDP , which explicitly called for block tariffs, lifeline services, and redistribution from businesses to consumers. Finally, the LGWP 's last chapter, on the Transformation Process, nearly entirely negated the roles of communities and municipal workers. Hence the document ended by appealing to citizens to trust a largely technocratic process. Residents of cities were miserable, in part because rural areas were also suffering enormously from neoliberal public policy. Results included rising unemployment due to agricultural mechanisation (to meet foreign competition) and the transformation of farm land to game ranches. The Landless People's Movement (2004, p. 1) observed that in nearly a decade since liberation, Pretoria failed to deliver on its promise to 'redistribute 30 per cent of the country's agricultural land from 60,000 white farmers to more than 19-million poor and landless rural black people and more than 7-million poor and landless urban black people within five years . . . Studies show that just over 2.3 per cent of the country's land has changed hands through land reform'. The land reform strategy was based upon World Bank 'willing seller, willing buyer' policy advice, by the same officials who were active in Zimbabwe's similarly failed reforms from 1980 to 2000.
One of the most obvious ways in which apartheid was constructed was in residential terms: who could live where. Such segregation did not end in 1994, but took on a classbased character. In 2003, Gauteng Province housing minister Paul Mashatile admitted that the resulting landscape had become an embarrassment: 'If we are to integrate communities both economically and racially, then there is a real need to depart from the present concept of housing delivery that is determined by stands, completed houses and budget spent'. His spokesperson, Dumisani Zulu, added, 'The view has always been that when we build low-cost houses, they should be built away from existing areas because it impacts on the price of property' (Saturday Star , 7 June 2003). Lew Geffen, the chief executive of a large Johannesburg real estate corporation, insisted instead that 'lowcost houses should be developed in outlying areas where the property is cheaper and more quality houses (can) be built' (Saturday Star , 7 June 2003). Given the power relations in the housing industry, it is reasonable to anticipate continuity, not change in Johannesburg's geography, featuring more such 'quality' houses, i.e., half as large, and constructed with flimsier materials than during apartheid; located even further from jobs and community amenities; characterised by mass disconnections of water and electricity; with lower-grade state services including rare rubbish collection, inhumane sanitation, dirt roads and inadequate storm-water drainage.
There remain additional sources of urban ecological strife. South Africa has scarce water resources, yet the ANC government permits extreme inequality in its distribution, with respect to natural surface and groundwater (as a consequence of apartheid land dispossession), and in water consumption norms, with wealthy urban families enjoying swimming pools and English gardens, and rural women queuing at communal taps in the parched ex-'Bantustan' areas for hours. South Africa also contributes more to global warming than nearly any economy in the world if CO 2 emissions are corrected for both income and population. Greenhouse gas emissions are 20 times higher than even the United States by that measure, and the emissions have been worsening over the last decade. Notwithstanding good solar, wind and tides potential, renewable energy is desperately underfunded. Instead, vast resources are devoted to nuclear energy R&D (including huge investments in pebble-bed nuclear reactors) and construction of Africa's largest hydropower facilities. The government's failure to prevent toxic dumping and incineration has led to a nascent but portentous group of mass tort (class action) lawsuits that may graduate from asbestos victims to residents who suffer persistent pollution in several extremely toxic pockets (South Durban, Sasolburg, Steel Valley) (Bond, 2002; Clarke, 2002; McDonald, 2002) .
The next question, in the context of the degeneration of socio-economic and ecological conditions for so many low-income urban residents, is whether the upsurge of protest that began in the late 1990s across South Africa's cities and towns represents the lever Polanyi cited as responsible for the double movement: systematic social resistance to the market. Can one go further, by identifying not just decommodification, but also a strategy for 'deglobalisation' (of capital) emanating from the South African urban social movements, consistent with the insights brought to bear by Luxemburg and Harvey? From Urban Protest to Post Neoliberal Policy?
For two decades, urban South Africa has been subject to extremely high levels of social protest, which numerous intellectuals and commentators identified as worthy of sustained analysis, especially during the early 1990s (Adler & Steinberg, 2000; Bernstein & McCarthy, 1994; Boaden & Taylor, 1992; Botha, 1992; Cross, 1992; Friedman, 1991 Friedman, , 1992 Friedman, , 1994 Jacobs, 1992; Marais, 2000; Mayekiso, 1996; Murray, 1995; Schlemmer, 1992; Shubane, 1992a,b; Shubane & Madiba, 1992; Swilling, 1991 Swilling, , 1992 Tsenoli and Mgidlana, 1994) . Subsequent publications dealt explicitly with governance debates as a result of the changed political landscape (Evaratt et al. , 1997). The more detailed studies reflected upon the ANC's systemic disrespect for (Lanegran, 1996; Meer, 1999; Pieterse, 1997; Seekings, 1996; White, 1995; Zuern, 2000) Á/ and in one case, explicit desire to demobilise (Makura, 1999 ) Á/ the community groups that had played such an important role in the dissolution of apartheid during the 1984 Á/1994 upsurge in urban protest. Given the much less politicised environment prevailing after apartheid was defeated, the main quantitative survey of civil society Á/ part of a Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies international study Á/ specified its subject with such a large lens as to lose the distinction between status quo and social-change organisations (University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Public and Development Management, 2002) . While other reviews of the urban movements' post-apartheid influence were more respectful, they retained enormous scepticism that the intense counter-hegemonic role achieved earlier in the decade could (or indeed even should) be restored under conditions of state legitimacy, democracy and development (Friedman, 2002; Greenstein, 2003; Greenstein et al ., 1998) .
As noted above, however, by the late 1990s, Pretoria's neo-liberal policies had severely deleterious effects on urban South Africa, leading to an upsurge of both resistance and published research (Anti-Privatisation Forum et al ., 2004; Barchiesi, 2004; Desai, 2004; Desai & Pithouse, 2004; Dwyer, 2004 ; http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs). A few analysts even identified a partial revival of some SA National Civic Organisation branches, for example (Heller & Ntlonkonkulu, 2001) . But because of their simultaneous political break from the ANC, the most substantial community groups that formed the Johannesburg Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and similar networked urban movements in the large cities were explicitly distinct from the organisational forms of the prior decade, even if many of their leaders had been forged in the earlier round of urban struggles. The composition of the urban working class was, likewise, changing. As new social subjectivities emerged, according to Franco Barchiesi (2002) , new movements became oriented to 'community self-management, construction of grassroots discourse, direct action in ways that are so rich, plural and diversified to be totally at odds with the hierarchical organisational practices of the traditional Left'. Such an alleged rupture with socialist traditions, however, is hotly contested, as key activists insist that the leading Left social forces have simply reconstituted themselves via community activism into urban movements, while the traditional goals of socialism via state power remain intact (Ngwane, 2003) .
In terms of thinking globally and acting globally, more recent studies describe the resurgence of urban movements' global vision in part through Johannesburg protests against the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development in August 2002 (Munnik & Wilson, 2003) , and in the construction of the Africa Social Forum and World Social Forum (Bond, 2004a; Cock, 2002 Cock, , 2003 . By the early 2000s, indeed, the key characteristic of the most active urban movements was profound hostility to both the world-class city agenda adopted by most of the large municipalities, and the national government's neoliberal response to economic globalisation. As a result, a new generation of book-length critical publications on (mainly urban) independent-left movements emerged (Alexander, 2002; Barchiesi & Bramble, 2003; Desai, 1999 Desai, , 2002 Hart, 2002; Kimani, 2003; Marais, 2000; McDonald & Pape, 2002) .
Behind this interest in urban movements lay renewed 'IMF Riots' against urban neoliberalism, which probably began in early 1997 in El Dorado Park, a low-income 'coloured' (mixed-race) township of Johannesburg. During a day-long protest, four people were killed over resident demands for lower municipal rates. In August 1997, several protests over service payments shook Johannesburg and Pretoria townships, the Mpumalanga town of Secunda, and even Butterworth in the distant ex-Transkei (where after three straight days of protest against municipal officials, a resident was shot dead before crowds dispersed). In KwaThema, east of Johannesburg, the houses of three ANC councillors were burned down by angry residents. Thousands of residents of Tembisa township, east of Johannesburg, demonstrated one winter afternoon in August 1997, leaving R13 million ($2 million) worth of electricity meters destroyed. Their anger was directed against the installation of a pre-payment system that, according to Tebogo Phadu (1998) , was 'being pushed by transnational corporations Á/ Siemens and Sony in particular . . . [and that] would have a profound impact on our tradition of community organisation/mobilisation as it promotes ''everyone for him/herself'' (i.e., individualizing payment), further marginalising the working class, particularly the unwaged'. Tembisa witnessed more strife over evictions from houses where commercial banks declared foreclosure. In 1999, the urban political transition Á/ from disorganised, often violent IMF riots to the construction of a sustained social movement Á/ began with the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC), the forerunner of the APF. Each step of the way, the process entailed mixing rights discourses regarding decommodified basic needs, with grievances against national policy and transnational corporate or financial agency sponsors, and adding collective self-reconnection tactics. The most frequent targets were municipal delivery agencies, Eskom, the World Bank, the British Department for International Development, US AID, and multinational water corporations (especially Suez, Vivendi, Saur and Biwater).
Recognising the problems with neoliberal policy and the intense resistance it was generating during the late 1990s, several government departments began to forthrightly criticise aspects of their own post-apartheid policies. These included the inadequate size, quality and location of urban housing; worsening segregation associated with urban infrastructure provision; growing public health (especially AIDS-related) problems associated with urban poverty; insufficient access to water, electricity and other municipal services due to household affordability constraints; and urban maldevelopment in the form of 'smokestack chasing' instead of holistic Local Economic Development. Even the socalled Growth, Employment and Redistribution macroeconomic strategy Á/ a structural adjustment programme co-authored by the World Bank and imposed on society in 1996 without consultation Á/ was criticised within government for failing to generate positive microeconomic, developmental and employment outcomes.
Indeed, once the market-oriented policies failed and a social backlash emerged, some policies were mitigated slightly. For example, in 2000 the ANC reacted to the cholera outbreak and rising social protest by dramatically shifting policy on water, agreeing to reinstate a 'lifeline' services promise made in the RDP. As the December 2000 municipal elections approached, this commitment was made: 'The ANC-led local government will provide all residents with a free basic amount of water, electricity and other municipal services so as to help the poor. Those who use more than the basic amounts, will pay for the extra they use'. A few weeks later, in January 2001, Muller conceded the link between cholera and water disconnections: 'Perhaps we were being a little too market-oriented' [in supplying water/sanitation services] (Interview, SABC tv show 'Newsmakers', 14 January 2001).
Does this sort of concession mean that a 'double movement' is now operating? After several hints about a new policy orientation that reflected both neoliberal failures and leftwing political pressure, the editor of the influential Business Day newspaper (Bruce, 2004) remarked: 'Has President Thabo Mbeki lost his mind? Has he lost his temper? His patience? Or has he just lost his faith?' Just a year earlier, in mid-2003, the same writer (Bruce, 2003) was more confident: 'The government is utterly seduced by big business, and cannot see beyond its immediate interests'.
The reality, however, has been persistence in neoliberal policies, with two very minor exceptions: privatisation only slowed (mainly due to popular resistance and adverse market conditions) but was not halted or reversed; and the tight post-apartheid fiscal straightjacket was loosened very slightly (providing a fractional increase in social spending as a percentage of GDP). But overall, the ANC continued to implement neoliberal macroeconomic and microdevelopment policies, as orthodox monetary policy was maintained, liberalisation of trade and finance proceeded apace, corporatisation of state enterprises sped up, and the ongoing attack by state service providers against low-income people continued. To illustrate, in June 2004, the Cosatu trade union federation expressed confidence in minister of public enterprises Alec Erwin: 'We welcome the fact that the minister has, like the president, placed the issue of employment creation at the centre of the restructuring of the State-Owned Enterprises'. By the end of August, Erwin had changed position, 'saying state-owned companies were not employment agencies and that managers had to do everything possible to make businesses profitable, including cutting jobs' (cited in Faniso, 2004) . The same philosophy prevails in municipal agencies responsible for urban services. Hence, a class-biased bureaucratic sabotage of the ANC's 'free basic water' promise was evident in revised July 2001 water tariffs following the December 2000 municipal elections. In most municipalities, officials set those tariffs at a small free lifeline of 6,000 litres per household per month (no matter how many people relied on the water), followed by a very steep, convex tariff curve. Generally, the next consumption block became unaffordable, leading to even higher rates of water disconnections in many settings. The 6,000 litres represent just two toilet flushes a day for a household of eight, for those lucky enough to have flush toilets. It leaves no additional water to drink, wash with, or clean clothes or the house. Optimally, a different strategy would provide a larger free lifeline tariff, ideally on a per-person, not per-household basis, and then rise in a concave manner to penalise luxury consumption (see Figure 1) .
To illustrate, Johannesburg's tariff was set by the council with help from Suez, and began in July 2001 with a high price increase for the second block of consumption. Two years later, the price of that second block was raised 32 per cent, with a 10 per cent overall increase, putting an enormous burden on poor households Á/ especially characterised by multiple family members with AIDS Á/ which used more than 6,000 litres each month. The rich got off with relatively small increases and a flat marginal tariff rate after 40 kl/hh/month, which did nothing to encourage water conservation.
To fully comprehend the water apartheid problem requires us to travel from Johannesburg's local circumstances up to the global scale to consider neoliberal capitalism's basic processes, and then back to local struggles. In general, the obvious reason for limiting water supply to poor people is to keep prices for rich people and big business as low as possible. In this sense, the logic of neoliberalism was superimposed upon the ANC's free water policy. Official documents reflect the debate: 'The World Bank has worked with the City [of Johannesburg](CoJ) in recent years to support its efforts in local economic development and improving service delivery', according to Bank staff and consultants. Early interventions included a 1993 study of services backlogs and the 1994 Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework. More recently, according to the Bank (2002, pp. 1 Á/9), Johannesburg's vision strategy document for 2030 'draws largely on the empirical findings of a series of World Bank reports on local economic development produced in partnership with the CoJ during 1999 Á/2002, and places greater emphasis on economic development. It calls for Johannesburg to become a world-class business location '. In turn, the Bank insists, businesses, not low-income consumers, should be allowed benefits that might later trickle down: 'The ability of the city to provide services is related to its tax revenue base or growth. The CoJ does not consider service delivery to be its greatest challenge to becoming a better city . . . . The city finds further support for its Vision in a survey that suggests that the citizens are more concerned about joblessness than socio-economic backlogs'. This is debatable, because Johannesburg residents listed electricity (48 per cent), water (42 per cent) and toilets (33 per cent) as three of the five worst problems in a 2001 survey. The other two were the city's failure to create jobs and maintain health clinics. For black 'African' Johannesburg residents, the figures were, respectively, 58, 53 and 45 per cent, ranking as the first, second and fourth worst problems (Johannesburg, 2001, pp. 8 Á/9, 14 Á/7). Of crucial importance is the impact of degraded urban services on AIDS. With both water-borne and respiratory diseases acting as vectors from HIV to full-blown AIDS, there are obvious merits of large volumes of free lifeline water and electricity (so as to prevent internal particulates within households associated with paraffin, coal and woodsmoke).
In contrast to improved residential services, Bank staff cited 'the World Bank's local economic development methodology developed for the CoJ in 1999', which 'sought to conceptualise an optimal role for a fiscally decentralised CoJ in the form of a regulator that would seek to alleviate poverty . . . through job creation by creating an enabling business environment for private sector investment and economic growth in Johannesburg' (emphasis added). This short-term commitment to urban entrepreneurialism negates poor people's needs for effective municipal services, paid for through cross-subsidies from business. Johannesburg would become less competitive as an export-oriented platform within global capitalism if higher tariffs on services were imposed. Advocates of a neoliberal approach to water provision and pricing, ranging from World Bank advisors to Johannesburg Water's (JW's) management, have introduced several unsound features. JW's pricing strategies fail to incorporate eco-social factors, including public health, gender equity, the environment or economic benefits such as employment generation or stimulation of small-scale enterprises. Johannesburg's narrow financial-rate-of-return policy fragments city services, disengaging civil servants in the water or electricity or waste-removal sectors from those in the health sector, for instance.
Because disconnected water pipes were increasingly (and unlawfully) reconnected by the APF and informal township plumbers, thousands of pre-paid meters were installed by JW to foil defaulters. The R342 million, five-year operation, termed 'Gcin'amanzi ', Zulu for 'conserve water', was aimed at 'self-disconnection' as the solution to durable nonpayment problems in Soweto, Orange Farm, Ivory Park and Alexandra. Identified as a key Mayoral Strategic Priority, the operation aimed to lower the 'unaccounted for water' rate in Soweto from 62 per cent to the standard 21 per cent water loss for the city's non-township neighbourhoods. Soweto is responsible for a R158 million annual loss, with 68 billion litres of water each year unaccounted for, compared to a total Johannesburg metropolitan area flow-through of 230 billion litres a year . The fight against pre-paid meters began in Orange Farm in 2002 and by 2003 created havoc in the Phiri section of Soweto, where repeated arrests did not succeed in normalising the JW strategy.
The APF's advocacy solution Á/ the thick line in the graph above Á/ was not considered by JW because it was not optimally profitable for the Paris partner firm, Suez. The distortion of market prices by cross-subsidy is a substantial deterrent to water privatisation, according to World Bank water official John Roome (1995, pp . 50 Á/1) in his 1995 advice to then water minister Asmal, Roome's power-point slideshow, which he later claimed was 'instrumental' in a 'radical revision' of Asmal's water pricing policy (World Bank, 1999, Annex C, p. 5), argued that municipal privatisation contracts 'would be much harder to establish' if poor consumers had the expectation of getting something for nothing. If consumers didn't pay, Roome continued, Asmal needed a 'credible threat of cutting service'. The logic played out over the subsequent years. The post-2000 move to further commodify Johannesburg's water through outsourcing to an international water corporation brought with it several new profitable techniques: revised tariffs that appeared to provide free water, but didn't; pre-paid meters aimed at self-disconnections; and no-flush sanitation of an appallingly low, gender-biased standard.
Moreover, the South African state regularly used force and bannings to prevent protests, such as on 21 March 2004 (Human Rights Day) when the Anti-Privatisation Forum was prevented from having a peaceful protest at, ironically, the opening of the Constitutional Court's Hillbrow headquarters; on election day 2004 when the Landless Peoples Movement faced mass arrest and torture; and on many other occasions when excessive use of police force was used to break up protests against genuine grievances. At the end of 2004, a hopeful signal was a finding by the SA Police Service Independent Complaints Directorate: the fatal shooting of Harrismith protester Tebogo Mkhonza during an initially peaceful march against the municipal council in August, should result in prosecution of those responsible.
In Conclusion
These struggles do not reflect a successful double movement yet, in which the neoliberal drive has been conclusively reversed. Independent left movements still campaign to turn basic needs into human rights: anti-retroviral medicines to fight AIDS; free water (50 l/person/day); free electricity (1 kWh/person/day); thorough-going land reform; prohibition on services disconnections and evictions; free education; and even a 'Basic Income Grant', as advocated by churches and trade unions. The idea is that all such services should be provided to all as a human right, and to the degree that it is feasible, financed through imposition of much higher prices for luxury consumption. If universal (not means-tested) benefits are provided and if in the process, a relatively greater degree of labour decommodification is achieved alongside more sympathetic urban Á/rural and gender relations, these advances might also provide the basis for solving some of the problems flagged by Luxemburg (1968) , Wolpe (1972) and Harvey (2003) . The rearticulation of capitalist and non-capitalist processes might, in this social policy scenario, provide the cross-subsidisation required to mitigate or even reverse the surplus flows that now underdevelop so many rural and women-headed households.
However, because the commodification of everything is still underway in South Africa, there are only hints of success, such as the ANC commitment to free basic services and the gradual provision of free medicines to people with AIDS. Nevertheless, the linkage of these movements at some point could provide the basis for a unifying agenda, resulting in a widescale political movement for fundamental social change. This will be especially true if linked to the demand to 'rescale' many political-economic responsibilities that are now handled by embryonic world-state institutions under the influence of neoliberal US administrations. The decommodification principle could become an enormous threat to global and local capitalist interests alike, in such forms as militant opposition to privatised services (reflected in the the regular expulsion of French and British water companies from the Third World); the denial of private intellectual property (based on the AIDS medicines precedent); indigenous people's and environmentalist resistance to biopiracy; the exclusion of GM seeds from agricultural systems (as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Angola have done); the nationalisation of industries and utilities; the imposition of exchange controls and import/export regulations alongside inward-oriented industrial policies; and the simultaneous empowerment of labour and consumer/community movements.
To make any progress, delinking from the most destructive circuits of global capital will also be necessary, combining local decommodification strategies and tactics with the call to defund and close the World Bank, IMF and WTO (http://www.worldbankboycott.org). Beyond that, the challenge for South Africa's progressive forces, as ever, is to establish the difference between 'reformist reforms' on the one hand, and reforms that advance a 'non-reformist' agenda on the other, allowing democratic control of social reproduction, of financial markets and ultimately of production itself. These sorts of reforms would strengthen democratic movements, directly empower the producers, and, over time, open the door to the contestation of capitalism itself. As has often been demonstrated in the establishment of social welfare policies (Bond, 2005d) , winning these more decisively can be accomplished only by strategies based upon strong alliances between labour and other social movements, and will probably also ultimately rely upon a class-conscious political party taking national state power. In the meantime, the issues are being struggled over and progressive strategies are being adopted, in South African and in other African settings (Bond, 2005e) . Thus, while urban South Africa does not yet represent a liberated zone in which public policy yet serves the majority, that fight has been joined in a manner Luxemburg, Polanyi, Wolpe and Harvey would well recognize.
